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Transparency and Economic Growth 
Svetla Kostadinova 
 
It is already obvious to everyone that the 
proposed amendments to the Law on Access to 
Public Information are illogical, irrational, truly 
disturbing, and must therefore not be passed. 
What is the issue in brief? 
Since the year 2000, in Bulgaria there has been a 
Law on Access to Public Information (LAPI), 
which enables the citizens and all interested 
parties to have access to information provided 
by state bodies or regional administrations. 
At present, if one requires such information, 
they have to, more or less, go through the 
following steps: 
1. Fulfill a notice for access to information; 
2. Send it to the appropriate body of 
power; 
3. Receive a response within 14 days; 
4. Pay a tax, defined by the Minister of 
Finance for the carrier of the 
information (floppy disk, CD, mail, 
etc.). 
As a result of the proposed amendments, the 
situation will change in the following way: 
1. One should decide which of two 
possible notices they should fulfill – 
Notice for access to information or 
Notice for reuse of information of the 
public sector. Since, practically, certain 
information is distributed in the public 
sector, every notice may provide 
grounds for being defined as a “second 
usage”, and the administration may 
require that all the notices be presented 
in this way. 
2. The catch with the Notice for reuse of 
information is that one has to prove 
interest – a condition which will 
automatically limit the possibility for 
more than half of the firms and citizens. 
On the other hand, it is unclear who will 
be in charge of deciding and on the basis 
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of what criteria will be determined is 
there or isn’t there interest present. 
3. Receive response in a 20 day period 
4. Access that is presently allowed may be 
denied to parts of certain documents.  
5. Pay a fee that must not be significantly 
higher than the costs of retrieving the 
information – since this detail may be 
understood differently by the various 
administrations, it is logical to foresee 
tax increases. 
Without commenting on the violation of the 
basic right for access to information and the 
insolent way of introducing of the draft law to 
Parliament (without pre-discussion and 
analyses), we strive to present the possible 
consequences, if the amendments are to be 
voted. We have to point out that the information 
for the implementation of the LAPI is retrieved 
from the Ministry of State Administration and 
Administrative Reform and refers to 2005. 
Since the cost-benefit analyses we implemented 
did not identify any benefits at all, we tried to 
calculate the possible costs. 
 
Direct costs 
- Payment of higher taxes – for the 
calculation of the costs we take as 
grounds the present amount of money 
gathered by these taxes, according to 
data from the National Statistical 
Institute. Since part of these notices for 
access to information are verbal, we 
calculated only the part of them being 
written. The common costs for higher 
taxes would be 60 000 lv. 
- Costs arising from the prolongation of 
the period for response – the prolonged 
time period will most probably affect the 
activities of some of the private firms, 
which will fail to fulfill certain services 
within the time limits. For the 
calculation of the costs we take into 
consideration the number of all notices 
for access to information, posted by 
firms; then we suppose that at least half 
of them will manage to prove interest, 
and we calculate the amount of the lost 
total value as a consequence of the 
increased time for allowance of access 
to information. We think that the time 
lost will not affect most of the firms and 
their activities, but we suppose that at 
least some of them will have to pay 
damages. Total amount of the damages 
will be 75 000 lv. 
- Costs for administration training for 
provision of the new regulations – 
trainings cost money. According to our 
analysis, at least 1 person from each of 
the 400 state and regional bodies will 
have to be trained. If the training lasts 
one day – the total cost of this will be 
12 000 lv. 
- Costs for going to court while 
appealing the negation of access to 
information – since the administration 
will be granted more power and will 
exercise it as it deems appropriate, we 
suppose that the number of appeals will 
double. If we accept that the appeals will 
have to pass through at least 2 instances 
of the court, which includes – paying to 
lawyers, paying taxes to the court 
(equally for the part of the petitioner), 
and paying the salaries of the state 
jurists. We include also all of the costs 
for the court itself as well. The total sum 
amounts 50 000 lv. 
And these are only some of the direct payments 
that will arise once the amendments are 
accepted. They tend to be insignificant though, 
compared to the estimation of the total effect on 
the economy from the lack of transparency and 
the lack of access to information. 
 
Common effects to the economy 
Increase in the expenditures covering the access 
to information leads to increase of the work of 
the government, increase in the costs of 
bargains, and decrease in common welfare. 
The consequences of these effects need a more 
thorough estimation analysis. Nevertheless, 
some simple relativities should be bared in mind. 
A review of the World Bank1 from 2005 shows 
that: 
o More transparent societies have more 
effective governments – the possibility 
of following closely the work of the 
                                                 
1 “Transparenting Transparency” Initial Empirics and 
Policy Applications, Ana Bellver and Daniel 
Kaufmann , The World Bank, draft, September 2005. 
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administration is a reason for 
improvement of the provided services. 
o The transparency influences positively 
the income per capita – the eased access 
to information means knowledge and 
awareness of government policies; there 
is predictability and the possibility for 
taking more informed decisions on the 
part of the economic subjects. This leads 
to increased effectiveness of the 
economy. 
o The transparency also influences the 
competitiveness of the economy. 
o The transparency also contributes to 
decreased levels of corruption 
o The transparency also encourages 
investment – local and foreign investors 
are clear about government policies, and 
thus they may easily estimate the risks 
associated with investing in the 
Bulgarian economy. 
 
 
An important conclusion from the review of the 
World Bank is that lower transparency leads to 
an average of 2% lower economic growth. For 
each economy this is of great importance. The 
conclusion we draw is that the proposed 
amendments to the law will affect negatively 
both society and the economy, and they must 
therefore be rejected. 
 
Is the Bulgarian Economy Overheating? 
Dimitar Chobanov 
 
Recent analyses prepared by experts 
representing different institutions present their 
views of the economic situation in Bulgaria and 
comment on both the positive development and 
the existence of potential risks. Of such nature 
are the reports prepared by the World Bank, the 
International Monetary Fund, the European 
Commission, and different rating agencies. The 
main indicators attracting their attention are the 
increase of the deficit to the current account of 
the pay-balance, the inflation, the increase in 
crediting and the GDP. According to common 
conclusions “overheating” of the economy is 
possible to occur, in which case there will be 
negative consequences to the economic agents in 
the country. 
The situation in Latvia is similar, based on 
symptoms similar to those seen in the Bulgarian 
economy. A very fresh example is the attack 
against the fixed rate of the local currency to the 
euro, which was followed by certain rough 
moments that triggered the implementation of 
emergency measures by the Latvian government. 
“Overheating of the economy”, as referred to in 
the abovementioned analyses, consists of the 
following. When the presented production 
capacity, comprising of capital, work and 
technologies, is insufficient to answer to the 
needs of the increasing demand, the 
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consequence is increase in price levels, in 
salaries, in employment and in the deficit of the 
current account. There are two possible ways out 
of this situation. The first is to decrease the inner 
demand by gradual “cooling” of the economy, 
and the second way is by sharp “cooling”, which 
could lead to unpleasant consequences. The 
latter may be combined with decrease in the 
level of trust of the local economies, outflow of 
capitals, decrease in the prices of assets and in 
economic growth. Similarly to the Latvian case, 
in this way the probability of appearance of a 
speculative attack against the fixed exchange 
rate may arise making way for a financial crisis 
to occur. 
The approach is based on comparison between 
the potential production level that could be 
achieved with the available resources and 
technologies and its actual level. This requires 
availability of data on the economics, which are 
still insufficient in quantity and quality, to allow 
the drawing of scientifically based estimates. 
Notwithstanding the fact that today the 
institutions use contemporary models, the 
results, on the basis of which they draw 
conclusions for the current situation of the 
economy, depend too much on probabilities, 
which disorientate them from the reality. 
The above-mentioned indicators do not show 
such development yet. One of the main 
symptoms for the “overheating” of the economy 
was the rapid increase in the prices of goods and 
services. The officially estimated inflation in 
Bulgaria for 2006 is 7.3% average annually, 
which is above the average level for the period 
after the introduction of the monetary fund 
(5.8%).  A key factor to the increase of inflation 
in most of the cases is the more rapid increase in 
the supply of money than the increase in the 
demand for money. Along with this, though, 
some other factors apply their forces, changing 
the relative price levels and affecting their 
common level. Such are the increased excise 
taxes on alcohol, petrol and petrol products, and 
tobacco products, which come as a result of the 
implemented government policies in relation to 
Bulgaria’s accession to the EU. Moreover, some 
administratively managed prices were increased 
in 2006. To sum up, the governmental policy 
contributes for one half of the increase in prices. 
Namely, the influence of the “market” factors is 
visible through smooth increase in the price 
level, which should not make room for any 
uneasiness. 
 
The next indicator related directly to the price 
levels is the increase of salaries. According to 
the data provided by the National Statistics 
Institute, they have increased on average by 
9.5% for 2006, estimated on the basis of the 
figures for 2005, which means that they have 
maintained their moderate rate. The actual 
increase in the estimation of inflation according 
to the index of consumer prices equals 2.1%. On 
the other hand, the increase in labor productivity 
is expected to be higher, meaning that sufficient 
pressure on the labour market cannot be exerted. 
Moreover the labour expenditures for the 
production of a single unit remain at the levels 
similar to those from 2005, which shows that the 
competitiveness of Bulgarian firms has been 
retained. 
The development of the labour market is 
characterized by an upheaval of economic 
activity and creation of more jobs, mainly in the 
private sector. Employment is rising on average 
4.4% annually mainly because of the decrease in 
number of the discouraged people. Nevertheless 
the coefficient of employment still remains low 
– 46.7%, indicating the existence of free labour 
resources. The index of unemployment marks on 
average a 9 % decrease annually , remaining 
close to the average values in the EU, but 
nevertheless still remaining high. On the whole 
we cannot draw the conclusion that pressure has 
been exerted on the labour market. The higher, 
in percents, increase of the salaries of qualified 
specialists is due to exact estimation of the 
difference between the labour productivity of the 
latter compared to the one of the rest of the 
employees, which shows that the Bulgarian 
economy is getting closer to the more developed 
economies in this aspect. 
According to official data, the takings of the 
trade banks from the non-governmental sector 
have slowed down in 2006 to 24.6% (32.4% in 
2005), while at the same time the increase of the 
takings from households has reached 30.6% 
(58.4% in 2005). This shows that the Bulgarian 
National Bank has successfully fulfilled its 
purposes of limiting the increase of crediting of 
the trade banks, but this happens on the account 
of increase in foreign crediting of Bulgarian 
enterprises. And crediting itself leads to increase 
in the inner demand; the inner demand leads to 
increase of the deficit to the current account of 
the pay-balance. 
According to some rough data the latter amounts 
to 16% of  the GDP, which for the part of most 
of the experts is a serious ground for concern. 
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Some 13% from the increase of the import is due 
to the increase of the demand of consumers 
goods, which is in generally viewed as increase 
of the demand on the whole, while some 2/3 of it 
is due to the increase in value of the imported 
sources and energy resources, the reason for 
which is the international price level of the 
latter. On the other hand, the matter of 
investment goods, which is viewed in the aspect 
of being positive for the economy,  bringing 
modern technology able to increase productivity, 
continues to keep the level of 1/4 of total import, 
which indicates stable investment activity levels 
in the Bulgarian economy. 
In general, the deficit of the current account 
displays the increase in the flow of capitals in 
the country, a result of the positive approach of 
the foreign investors and their anticipation of 
realization of profit in Bulgaria. The finance of 
the deficit happens usually through long-term 
means, such as direct investments. This results 
simultaneously in increase of the national debt 
on one hand and more possibilities for increase 
of demand in long-term period on the other. 
This is the direction that the Bulgarian 
government should follow into conducting its 
policies – to encourage the demand. This could 
be achieved either by taking measures for the 
increase of the flexibility of the labour market, 
or by reforming of the judicial system, 
improvement of the working results in the public 
sector and in particular – of the state 
administration, improvement of the quality of 
education, and reduction of the tax burden. The 
purpose is that the state functions be limited, 
while the rest keep functioning properly and 
effectively in contribution to the activity of the 
private sector, not in its opposition. Thus, the 
concentration of physical and human capital will 
be promoted, which on a long-term scale means 
greater room for economic growth that doesn’t 
leave room for doubt when it comes to its 
steadiness. 
 
 
 
 
 
Bulgarian telecommunications sector 
Regulatory issues, licensing and how it plays 
into the business side 
Veliko Dimitrov 
 
I would not discuss the overall objectives of the 
Law on Telecommunications (LT) as stated in 
the exordium since they sound, as in many other 
normative acts, strongly in favor of creating and 
maintaining competition, establishing free 
market principles, proclaiming efficiency, etc. In 
fact, as in many other areas, this is not exactly 
the case and in many directions imposed 
regulations are hampering competition.  
The main regulator is the Communications 
Regulation Commission. Its legal capacity and 
authority is as follows where highlighted in bold 
are those authorities, which I believe are most 
crucial (negatively) for the overall sector 
performance as well as each company’s 
behaviour in particular: 
• Carries out necessary actions related to 
the issuance of licenses, stipulated by 
law; 
• Issues, amends, supplements, suspends, 
terminates and revokes individual 
licenses for carrying out 
telecommunication activities; 
• Issues class licenses for 
telecommunication activities, registers 
and writes off their registration; 
• Works out and presents for adoption 
by the Council of Ministers draft 
normative acts stipulated by law (it 
does not have necessarily a negative 
impact, however examining current 
constellation, I have to assert that certain 
provisions could not have a positive 
effect as a whole; however not at last, 
under the influence and the direction of 
legislating of EU politicians); 
• Studies the respective markets for the 
purpose of determining operators 
having significant market power 
(SMP operators); market segmentation 
performed by the regulator does not 
reflect modern reality at all, which I will 
devote special attention further below; 
• Determines SMP operators and takes 
decisions regarding the imposing 
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them specific obligations stipulated by 
law; 
• Assigns the provision of universal 
telecommunication service; 
• Controls the principles of price 
formation stipulated by this law, i.e. 
of the SMP operators; 
• Controls as well the quality of the 
service and the requirements for 
providing universal telecommunication 
service according to the law; 
• Various legal authorities related to the 
management of the radio frequency 
spectrum.   
  
According to current legislation, there are two 
qualitavely different types of telecom operators: 
ordinary and those having “significant market 
power”.  
By a motivated decision, the Commission 
determines that a public operator has a 
substantial impact on the market (SIM) when the 
operator possesses a share equal or larger than 
25% of the respective telecom market with a 
territorial range determined by his license. The 
Commission may also determine that an operator 
has a SIM for a share less than 25% of the 
respective market based on: 
 
• The ability of the operator to have an 
impact on the respective market (no 
matter how it is to be estimated, it is a 
mere market outcome unless the 
dominant position is created and 
maintained by the state, which means 
again regulation); 
• The degree of impact of the operator on 
the accession devices to the end users 
(the respective infrastructure is finally 
either built up or acquired on own risk 
and responsibility); 
• The access of the operator to financial 
resources and gathered experience (it is 
hardly to imagine that anybody could 
participate in the telecommunications 
sector without having relevant 
experience and furthermore access to 
financial resources). 
 
First of all, each and every one operator could be 
theoretically defined having SMP following the 
broadly used definition and vague criteria as 
well as the virtually unlimited Commission’s 
authority, in taking that decision.  
Second, such a division of market players into 
“good” and “bad” and subsequently imposing 
specific regulations to those having SMP 
(currently in Bulgaria in the fixed lines 
telephone services there is just one operator 
determined to possess SMP – “Bulgarian 
Telecommunication Company”) is basically 
wrong. Those specific regulations, which I 
would partially review below, are in a way 
burdensome and put players working under 
different conditions in one and the same market.  
And third, as indicated, the criteria on which the 
decision may be based are by no means tangible, 
nor are they justifiable from the viewpoint of a 
functioning market and market principles, free 
competition and finally initiation of more 
investments. 
 
Market segmentation 
Currently, the legislation provides for a market 
segmentation, which no longer reflects the 
modern reality. Subdividing telephone services 
into fixed lines, mobile and to a certain extent 
the data transmission (given that there are 
various Internet-based platforms for voice 
transmission in real time like Skype) has lost its 
accuracy in recent days.   
Separating market artificially allows the 
Commission’s easily and apparently rightful to 
determine SMP operators, i.e. to set specific 
regulations and control. 
 
Universal Telecommunication Service 
A universal telecommunication service is a 
service of a definite quality, submitted to every 
end user regardless of his geographic position, at 
an affordable price.  
The UTS operator may request a compensation 
for proved net losses on condition that his share 
is fewer than 80% of the market of the fixed 
voice telephone service, i.e. the BTC is not 
eligible to be compensated according to how the 
Commission is currently estimating market 
shares.  
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Specific, unbundled access to a subscriber line 
and rented lines 
The issue, whether there should be any regulated 
access to built infrastructure or not, had been yet 
on the agenda worldwide for many years.  
I surely could not agree with the obligation 
that a SMP operator should provide any sort 
of access to its infrastructure at prices and 
under conditions determined by the 
Commission.  
 
I base my argumentation merely on property 
rights and if you let me show you an example 
with a warehouse and conceivably how one 
could be forced to rent half of it at a price not 
negotiated by both sides, but imposed externally, 
it turns out to be more or less obvious. Of 
course, the scales of investments in 
telecommunications are greater, however this 
does not change the mere market logic. 
Moreover, as a result, the return on these 
investments should be certainly greater and this 
should not be impeded.  
On the second place, while dealing with the 
issue, I think also of what great disincentives to 
investment such obligations could result in for 
all the other operators (given that they can 
always use any infrastructure they want).  
What major changes would set in (or not) 
after the adoption of the Law on electronic 
services (LES)2, which shall replace the 
present LT? 
• The overall state policy and involved 
government bodies remain the same;  
• Licensing generally drops off; for 
operators using “limited resource” such 
as radio frequency spectrum and 
national numbering space there would 
be a registration procedure; this would 
probably be the only amendment that 
would influence the sector positively; 
• The division between SMP operators 
and others remains; 
• After studying “different” markets if 
there is “effective” competition, the 
Commission shall determine SMP 
                                                 
2 The full text can be downloaded at the following 
address: 
http://www.parliament.bg/?page=app&lng=bg&aid=
4&action=show&lid=1634 (in Bulgarian) 
operators and impose them specific 
regulations; 
According to a statement of the Secretary 
General of the Commission Mr. Ljubomir 
Stoitchkov delivered several months ago, the 
telecommunications sector should be subdivided 
into 18 (eighteen) distinct markets, each of them 
separately regulated. As already stated, the 
artificially division of the market is completely 
wrong and the adoption of the new law would 
impose additional burdens on the market 
players.   
As a conclusion, I would like to say that 
discriminating market players could not ever be 
for the good either for them or for their 
customers. 
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Global Index of Outsourcing Destinations for 
2006 
Metodi V. Metodiev 
 
Last week, the official results of the annual 
index of the consulting company A.T.Kearney, 
determining the most attractive destinations for 
conducting certain activities, also known as 
outsourcing (outsourcing - Outside Resource 
Using) was released. Conceptually defined, 
outsourcing is an instrument for the export of a 
certain activity specific to a company and its 
transfer for completion by another company. 
Briefly its purpose is to: 1) save some financial 
resources to the company; 2) increase the 
effectiveness of the work; 3) free company 
resources for the development of other activities. 
The index is comprised of 50 countries, and it is 
compiled on the basis of 3 different indicators: 
- financial attractiveness – includes sub-
indicators such as average salary, prices 
of rents, electricity, telephony, tax 
burden, corruption, stability of the 
currency, etc. 
- qualification and availability of 
workers 
- business environment – reviews the 
macroeconomic and political situation of 
the country 
The most desirable destinations for outsourcing 
for 2006 have been India and China – first and 
second in line respectively. Bulgaria is 9th and it 
is the only European country in the Top 10. 
Table 1. 2006 Index of Outsourcing  
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Source: Report of the consulting company 
“A.T.Kearney” ( the table shows the first 10 
countries of  all 50 included in the index). 
 
One of the main reasons that certain countries 
are desirable outsourcing partners is that the 
costs for production of one unit of the good are 
lower compared to the rest of the alternative 
destinations for the transfer of such activities. 
But we must not review this indicator as an 
isolated determinant of the attractiveness of a 
country. As we already mentioned, the Index is 
comprised of many different sub-indicators, all 
of which are no less important then the cost of 
labor. 
In the past few years, Bulgaria has been included 
in different studies of various global 
organizations, which follow and analyze the 
environment for business in many different 
regions of the word. In its methodology, the 
Index of Outsourcing is not much different than 
all other such studies. Viewing it on the level of 
numerous differentiated indicators, it is clear 
that the greatest weight is put on the so-called 
financial attractiveness indicator, followed by 
the qualification and availability of the workers, 
and lastly by the business environment indicator. 
 
What may be improved so that we become 
even more attractive to foreign business 
initiatives? 
Following the chronology of the comprising 
elements of the index, we may distinguish a few 
main directions, in which Bulgaria has to 
introduce improvements urgently: 
• Tax burden – lowering taxes will 
stimulate investments 
• Corruption – this issue, inevitably, has 
to do with the transparency of the work 
of state institutions on one hand, and on 
the other – with the effectiveness of the 
judicial system 
• Employees’ qualification – a thorough 
reform of the higher education system. 
We need competitive universities, 
introduction of a voucher system, 
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development of programs and teaching, 
orientated to the needs of the business 
• Respect for the right to property and 
the freedom of contracting 
 
 
For those who do not pay social security - 
jail? 
Adriana Mladenova 
 
Do people who don’t pay the whole amount of 
their social security taxes deserve to go to 
prison? Just as much as they deserve to go to jail 
for preferring to go to a vacation or buy a home 
or a car for their kids, rather then give this 
money to a wealthy unknown firm that promises 
to build them a house. From an ethical point of 
view, this is the analogy of the proposal for 
imprisonment of those who don’t pay their 
social security taxes that was being discussed in 
public last week. Here is, in brief, what the 
whole turmoil is about. 
A debate, initiated by Minister Emilia Maslarova 
was held on Monday concerning the “problems 
and perspectives of the current pension system”, 
in which present and former representatives of 
the Ministry of Labor and Social Policy, 
employers, and syndicates took part. 
The following are the main topics of discussion 
released if front of the media: 
- Lack of payment of social security taxes 
– more than 40 % of the employers, 
according to the figures of the Ministry 
of Labor and Social Policy, do not 
insure their employees on the full 
amount of their salary, and therefore 
they pay less social assurances then 
required; 
- The deficit of the Pension Fund to the 
National Social Security Institute (NSSI) 
increases every year 
- The dissatisfaction among pensioners 
increases equally because of the low 
pensions they receive. Some of them 
feel deprived from the introduction of 
the point system and they are of the 
opinion that this system is unfair 
because of the formula of the estimation 
of the pension rate. 
The following are the measures that were 
discussed at the meeting: 
- Enforcement of the control and the fines 
of the employers and the employees 
which hide income; the introduction of 
legal ways for searching personal 
responsibility rather then 
administratively fining the  offenders 
according to the provisions of the Social 
Insurance Code 
- Imprisonment for those who insure 
themselves on lower then the real 
income they receive 
- Increase of the minimum of the social 
insurance for some of those who insure 
themselves – like dentists, lawyers, etc. 
- Leveling of the pension age to 65 years 
for men and women or eventually – 
increase in that minimum – to 68 years. 
- State employees to bare the social 
insurances made on account of the 
employees – at present all of the social 
insurances that are due to the state 
employees – like judges, policemen, 
military are being paid by the State 
budget. 
 
These proposals are inadequate for the reality in 
Bulgaria though. 
First, the sources of all problems must be 
defined clearly and the counter measures must 
be pointed out. The grey market along with the 
mass abuse of social security tax payments are 
just symptoms of a ‘sick’ pension system, which 
itself is a result of the wrong design of the whole 
compulsory state insurance scheme. The 
measures proposed at the meeting will only 
make the situation worse, they will increase the 
burden carried by the private sector and the 
employees, rather than create stimuli for all of 
them to pay their legally defined taxes and 
payments. 
Why do the business and the employees not pay 
their social security taxes in full? 
 
It is the answer to this question that we must 
find first, before starting to suggest counter 
measures. And the answer is more than obvious: 
 
Institute for Market Economics, Bulgaria 
Economic Policy Review, issue 48, March 2007 
10
because people have lost confidence in the state 
pension system, they don’t believe that the state 
is able to provide them security, namely the 
benefits that they are promised to receive in the 
future in return for their social security payments 
now.  They feel these are lower than the 
alternative price taken from their income. For 
the working people, having more money now is 
more valuable then receiving a promise for a 
pension, which will not be formed on the basis 
of their personal contribution, but will be 
required on the basis of enforced solidarity (as 
absurd as this phrase may sound) of the future 
generations mixed with the policy of the state. 
And judging from the present condition of the 
pensioners – it will be insufficient for leading a 
normal life. 
Under these circumstances it is understandable 
why people prefer to increase their net income, 
which they can use for the consumption of 
different goods, for savings or for investing in 
more profitable beginnings then putting their 
money into a doomed to failure system, which 
shows no symptoms of recovering or reforming. 
It is the personal interests and motivation who 
dictate the rational actions of market subjects, 
and the state machinery, as much as it may try, it 
may never change this regularity. The people are 
convinced that the state sectors are being robbed, 
that corruption is abundant, that the state 
enterprises are not profitable to a great extent, 
that the public resources are mismanaged, that 
the transparency on expenditure of tax received 
incomes is insufficient, and that the bureaucrats 
have grown resistant to changing and optimizing 
of their work, which for them would mean only 
cutting jobs. Hence, should people who prefer to 
keep their money, for the education of their 
children, for taking care of their parents, for 
investing and so on, be subject to imprisonment? 
Which of the mentioned above is a crime? It is 
true that laws are created to be binding to all, but 
when laws themselves are truly unbearable and 
do not guarantee security, it is more than ceratin 
that people will not abide by them. Therefore, 
the mass tax hiding results not from the spoiled 
morality of employers and employees, but from 
a profoundly mistaken social security tax 
system. 
Secondly, it is important to realize that even if 
social security taxes were paid by the state 
employees, it would not result in reducing of the 
Pension Fund deficit, because even at present, 
the taxes of those employed in the state sector 
are being covered by the state budget and 
transferred to the budget of the NSSI and the 
Pension fund (in fact, it doesn’t matter who pays 
the social security taxes – the deficit of the fund 
will remain unchanged and present). 
On the whole, there will be certain benefits for 
the state budget if the idea of state employees 
paying social security taxes on their own is 
realized (amounting to a couple of million leva) 
under the condition that their pre-tax salaries 
remain unchanged. This, in figures, means 
reduction in their net income with some 30% per 
month. Such a measure is extremely 
discouraging for every employee, on the one 
hand, and on the other – it is extremely 
unpopular, and it is hard to believe that there are 
politicians who would be willing to take such a 
step. Not to mention that the possible fiscal 
effects form such a measure would not be great. 
The budget surplus only for January 2007 
amouns to some 103 million leva, which shows 
that there is enough income to the budget to 
cover the state’s common expenditures, but 
those who are defined as “pensions” are not 
enough. 
The second possible way for transferring such a 
burden of all employees to the state employed 
employees is if their pre-tax salaries are 
increased in order for their net income to remain 
the same. Since the salaries of the state 
employed are covered by the taxpayers in the 
private sector, such a move would only mean re-
allocation of resources, which brings along with 
itself extra administrative and transactional 
costs, but no benefits. The reform in the state 
administration that would actually lead to some 
positive results is one that would lead to its 
effectiveness and optimization through 
decreased numbers of state employees. While 
the only way out for the pension system is its 
privatization and transformation via the 
introduction of individual accounts of the 
insured employees. (More on this topic is 
available on the internet site of the IME’s Tax 
Bulletin  – “ Can the social insurance be lower, 
and the pensions- higher?” and  the IME’s web 
page on arguments in favor of private pension 
system). 
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The Premier Institutions for the Study of 
Economics – 
The London School of Economics and Political 
Science3 
Momtchil Krastev 
 
Ever since its founding in 1895, the London 
School of Economics and Political Science (or 
simply LSE) has been one of the big names of 
British higher education. In fact, the school’s 
influence has gone far beyond the borders of the 
United Kingdom, and the LSE has established 
itself as perhaps the top institution for the study 
of the social sciences anywhere in the world. 
Only a handful of institutions can compare when 
it comes to the study of anthropology, 
economics, international relations, law, 
management, philosophy of science, political 
science, and sociology, among others. For its 
many accomplishments in these fields, the LSE 
is often compared to such fine schools as 
Oxford, Cambridge, Harvard, Yale, Columbia, 
and the University of Chicago.     
It is certainly true that among LSE’s students 
and faculty have been many notable individuals, 
including around 30 heads of state and 14 Nobel 
Prize winners. From academia, George Bernard 
Shaw, Bertrand Russell, Karl Popper, Harold 
Laski, Friedrich von Hayek, Michael Oakeshott, 
Imre Lakatos, and many other important thinkers 
have taught at the school. In the field of 
economics, in particular, some of the most 
important contributions to our understanding of 
the subject were made by theorists based at the 
LSE. In addition, many high-profile political 
figures (including over 40 of the current 
members of the House of Lords) both from the 
UK and abroad have been associated with the 
school, such as former U.S. President John F. 
Kennedy, former Federal Reserve Chairman 
Paul Volcker, and banker and philanthropist 
David Rockefeller. The list of notable faculty 
and alumni is indeed long. 
                                                 
3 For detailed information on the LSE’s history, 
influence, and notable alumni and faculty, see the 
following: 
http://www.lse.ac.uk/informationAbout/aboutLSE/De
fault.htm; 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/London_School_of_Eco
nomics 
 
But the London School of Economics does not 
rely on past glories, and it continues to strive for 
the highest standards of excellence. Indeed, 
various publications, taking into consideration 
the quality of teaching and research, among 
other factors, have placed LSE very high in their 
university rankings. In terms of research quality, 
the LSE has scored second in England, behind 
only Cambridge, its most prominent rival in the 
study of economics (as the famed Keynes-Hayek 
debates still shape the two major schools of 
economic thought today, as nations still debate 
the merits of the welfare state versus an 
economy solely controlled by the market). As it 
regards rankings of social science institutions, 
the LSE has scored second in the world, this 
time behind only Harvard. And to its high 
standards of both teaching and research have 
contributed not only its faculty but also its 
students, which, coming from over 150 
countries, make the school easily the most 
international in the world.   
An LSE education offers many advantages, 
including almost unrivaled access to academics 
and academic resources (i. e. the British Library 
of Political and Economic Science). The 
possibilities to create networks with high-caliber 
students as well as attend public lectures given 
by the likes of Bill Clinton, Nelson Mandela, 
Kofi Annan and many others are also present. 
The school’s location in the very center of 
London and its links to government and the 
business make it especially attractive to students 
as well. But the ones, lucky enough to have been 
admitted (as for many courses the acceptance 
rate is below 10 per cent) and who have 
managed to complete a degree there, often 
discover the total value of an LSE education 
after they have left the school. It indeed serves 
many of them well, throughout their careers and 
lives, as the school’s alumni continue to have a 
large impact on the field of economics and 
beyond.  
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